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In sensorimotor activities, learning requires efﬁcient information processing, whether in
car driving, sport activities or human–machine interactions. Several factors may affect the
efﬁciency of such processing: they may be extrinsic (i.e., task-related) or intrinsic (i.e.,
subjects-related). The effects of these factors are intimately related to the structure of
human information processing. In the present article we will focus on some of them,
which are poorly taken into account, even when minimizing errors or their consequences
is an essential issue at stake. Among the extrinsic factors, we will discuss, ﬁrst, the effects
of the quantity and quality of information, secondly, the effects of instruction and thirdly
motor program learning. Among the intrinsic factors, we will discuss ﬁrst the inﬂuence of
prior information, secondly how individual strategies affect performance and, thirdly, wewill
stress the fact that although the human brain is not structured to function errorless (which
is not new) humans are able to detect their errors very quickly and (in most of the cases),
fast enough to correct them before they result in an overt failure. Extrinsic and intrinsic
factors are important to take into account for learning because (1) they strongly affect
performance, either in terms of speed or accuracy, which facilitates or impairs learning, (2)
the effect of certain extrinsic factors may be strongly modiﬁed by learning and (3) certain
intrinsic factors might be exploited for learning strategies.
Keywords: sensorimotor activities, reaction time, errors, learning, information processing
Whether in sport, car driving, music, or human–machine interac-
tions, learning sensorimotor activities requires efﬁcient informa-
tion processing. Knowing some principles of human information
processing may be useful to propose tasks and/or learning meth-
ods in conformity with these principles, so as to facilitate their
realization and improve performance. Presenting some basics of
these principles is the aim of the present article.
Evenwhen the level of vigilance is optimal, the efﬁciency of such
processing can be affected by extrinsic (task-related) or intrinsic
(subject-related) factors. We call here “extrinsic” those factors on
which the subject cannot act. Extrinsic factors may be related to
the quantity of stimuli to be processed, the way decisions must be
taken, the ability to exploit and consolidate appropriately motor
programs or the availability of prior information regarding future
events. We call here “intrinsic” those factors on which the subject
can act. They may be related to strategic effects, voluntary orien-
tation of attention (in time and space), motor preparation (in time
and space) or action monitoring. In fact, intrinsic factors could
be uniﬁed in terms of executive control processes (Norman and
Shallice, 2000).
We will, ﬁrst, discuss of extrinsic factors and, secondly, present
intrinsic ones with a special emphasis on action monitoring
processes.
EXTRINSIC FACTORS
STIMULUS-RELATED
We will not discuss here the effects of the quality of the stimuli
since it is a commonplace that degraded or ambiguous stimuli
impair perception and identiﬁcation processes, which results in
impaired performance.
Number of relevant stimuli
The number of stimuli to be processed is a critical determinant of
performance.
If the stimuli are presented sequentially, increasing their num-
ber by time unit amounts increasing the time pressure put on the
task, which will result in an increase of the error rate, according
to the well established speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT; Fitts, 1966;
Pew, 1969; Usher et al., 2002; Bogacz et al., 2009). We will brieﬂy
present SAT in section 2 (intrinsic factors).
In case several relevant stimuli must be presented simultane-
ously, increasing their number will force subjects to share their
attention between these different stimuli, which will increase
the reaction time (RT) and the likelihood to produce errors.
This increase is explained by the fact that, all other things
being equal, (1) processing of a relevant stimulus will inter-
fere with processing of other relevant ones, because human
information processing capacities are limited (Kahneman, 1973;
Norman and Bobrow, 1975; Franconeri et al., 2013); (2) the
mere fact to have one’s attention to be shared between several
stimuli may often induces a cost, per se (Navon and Gopher,
1979). This cost may also be manifested by an increase in RT
and/or an increase in error rate. Therefore, if performance is
critical, attention sharing, when possible, should be avoided
in sensorimotor activities (Hyman, 1953). We do not intend
to discuss this point further since accurate and comprehensive
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reviews on this subject are already available (e.g., Wickens, 2002,
2008).
Number of irrelevant stimuli
When a single relevant stimulus (target) is presented among sev-
eral irrelevant ones (odd stimuli), this stimulus must be selected
among all the other ones. This selectionprocess requires that atten-
tion is oriented toward the relevant stimulus while ignoring the
odd ones.
In general terms, attention can be automatically captured (e.g.,
Posner and Cohen, 1984), or voluntarily oriented (e.g., Posner
et al., 1980)1. The distinction between automatic and controlled
processes has been theorized and empirically evaluated by the pio-
neering work of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977), and has revealed to be particularly useful in sev-
eral research ﬁelds and especially in the ﬁeld of attention. Several
properties are assumed to oppose these two modes of processing:
while automatic processes are supposed to be“fast, parallel, almost
effortless . . . not limited by capacity . . . not under direct subject
control” (Schneider et al., 1984, p. 1), controlled processes present
the opposite properties. Regan (1981) has pointed a very impor-
tant distinction between two meanings of the term “automatic”:
involuntary, [i.e., unintentionally triggered and, when triggered,
impossible to stop intentionally (Kahneman and Treisman, 1984)]
and effortless [i.e., capacity-free and not subject to interferences
(Kahneman and Treisman, 1984)]. Regan noted that these two
properties may not necessarily be tied (Regan, 1981).
Regarding attentionnal processes, the important point lies in
the “costless” nature of automaticity since, according to Schneider
and Shiffrin (1977), it is admitted that a “special type of automatic
process” can “direct attention automatically to a target stimulus”
(Schneider and Chein, 2003, p. 527).
An example of this automatic capture can be found in the
“pop out” phenomenon. Because elementary features of a stim-
ulus are processed in parallel, if a target differs from odd ones
by a single elementary feature, then, attention will be automat-
ically captured at its location. As a consequence, the RT or the
error rate will remain unaffected by the presentation of a target
among odd stimuli, whatever their number (Treisman and Gelade,
1980; Nakayama and Silverman, 1986)2. In the visual modality, for
example, these features can be color, orientation, brightness, size,
depth, or direction of motion. Pop out effects can be accounted
for by the fact that the visual structures process elementary fea-
tures in (rather) separate specialized pathways (e.g., Livingstone
and Hubel, 1988; Kastner et al., 1997; Treisman and Kanwisher,
1998, for a review).
Now, if the conjunction of two (or more) elementary features
is needed to characterize a target among odd stimuli, the elemen-
tary features of the stimuli need to be bound to form unitary
objects; attention would be responsible for this binding mecha-
nism (Robertson, 2003), as metaphorically proposed by Treisman
1Automatic capture and controlled orientation may also be referred to as “bot-
tom up” and “top down” control of attention, respectively, in the literature (e.g.,
Buschman and Miller, 2007).
2Although more complex features (such as closure), or even extensive practice may
result in “pop out” effects (reviews in Treisman, 1996; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002),
which stress, in the latter case, the importance of learning.
and Gelade (1980) “. . . focal attention provides the “glue” which
integrates the initially separable features into unitary objects”
(p. 98). In this case, voluntary attention must be directed seri-
ally to each stimulus of a display which results in a linear increase
of RTs with the increasing number of odd stimuli, (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Nakayama and Silverman, 1986). In this case, odd
stimuli act as distracters.
This distinction between automatic and controlled modes of
attentionorienting is not only justiﬁedby thepsychophysical prop-
erties of human performance; it is also supported by physiological
data showing that the way structures involved in attention orient-
ing (namely prefrontal and parietal areas) are recruited, differs in
the automatic and controlled modes (e.g., Buschman and Miller,
2007).
From what precedes it appears that whenever possible, it is
preferable to present information in such a way that attention
is automatically oriented toward the relevant stimuli. Moreover,
when this is not completely possible, the number of stimuli to be
processed at a time should not be too high, especially when one has
to learnnew skills. Although this last pointmay seem trivial it is not
always born in mind in man–machine interface designs or man–
machine interactions. Operators are often presented with several
stimuli corresponding to information that might be useful, even
when these stimuli are useless most of the time (the implicit idea
here seems to be that any possibly useful information must always
be available andpresented to the operator); as a consequence, if not
necessary at a given moment, these stimuli will act as distracters,
especially for non experts during task learning. This, for example,
might be the case in certain head up displays.
Let us now consider reading: there is no time pressure stricto
sensu in reading but most readers do it at the fastest pace compat-
ible with a good comprehension of the text. Learning to read is a
long and difﬁcult process; it seems that for these reasons, textbooks
for learning to read have taken into account the aforementioned
principles, maybe intuitively or by trials and errors, but in any
case, most often, each page of these textbooks is very accurately
organized. First, pages present, (1) very large letters (allowing easy
and fast processing), (2) a few number of relevant information
by page (which avoids too much attention sharing) and (3) they
present the to-be-learnt letters or association of letters in such a
way that they pop out. Regarding this last point, for example, if the
phoneme corresponding to a given letter (or to a group of letters
such as “sh”) is the one to be learnt, then, the corresponding let-
ter(s) is (are) generally written in bold or even in color, inside the
word. As a consequence, the attention of the child is automatically
(and effortlessly) driven to the relevant place(s) in the page and in
the word.
These examples illustrate how simple principles regarding
the organization of the stimuli to be processed may facilitate
stimulus-related processing and, as a consequence, learning and
performance.
RESPONSE-RELATED
Position of the effectors and response programming
Most often, when responses are triggered under time pressure,
they are executed in a ballistic mode. When these responses
are well learnt, it is often assumed that they are executed
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via motor programs (Paillard, 1960). These programs can be
viewed as sets of abstract instructions specifying explicitly cer-
tain characteristics of the responses to be produced (e.g., Keele,
1968; Requin et al., 1991). Several behavioral (Rosenbaum, 1980;
Lépine et al., 1989) and physiological data in monkeys (Geor-
gopoulos et al., 1986; Riehle and Requin, 1989; Riehle, 2005)
or humans (MacKay and Bonnet, 1990; Leuthold and Jentzsch,
2009) suggest that these programs specify certain parameters of
the incoming movement.
Except in certain speciﬁc cases where they are innate, motor
programs emerge from practice. In other words, most motor pro-
grams are learnt and, as such, the issue of motor programs is
relevant to motor expertise and learning.
A consequence of the concept of motor program is that once
the execution of the program has begun, it goes on until its end. A
consequence of the parametric conception is that, for the param-
eters to be efﬁciently set before response onset, the initial state of
the moving effectors must be known accurately. It has been estab-
lished for long that, for programmed responses, proprioceptive/
tactile signals are poorly involved in the control of ongoing activi-
ties but that they are critical to build, consolidate or update motor
programs, during practice (Keele,1973). Moreover, proprioceptive
and/or tactile information is critical for being informed (before
the movement) on the initial position of a given effector (Ghez
et al., 1990; Gordon et al., 1995) and it has been shown that inac-
curacy of initial proprioceptive signals results in pointing errors
(Vindras et al., 1998). This indicates that this type of informa-
tion is critical to set the appropriate parameters of the motor
programs.
The quality of proprioceptive/tactile information is not uni-
form across all limb positions (Rossetti et al., 1994). Fortunately, it
is possible to easily identify optimal positions since thosewhich are
spontaneously judged as themost comfortable are also thosewhich
produce more accurate position signals (Rossetti et al., 1994).
These comfortable positions are those which correspond to the
median range of each joint position. This median range also cor-
responds to a minimization of medial muscle tension (Rossetti
et al., 1994). It is likely that “. . . discomfort could . . . prevent the
motor system from adopting postures where position signals are
degraded, in order to keep the arm within a range of reliable
encoding of posture” (Rossetti et al., 1994, p. 131).
As a consequence, a way to improve motor programs learn-
ing and/or motor programs execution is to improve the quality
of initial proprioceptive and/or tactile information. Special atten-
tion must therefore be drawn on this point during the acquisition
of motor skills. This is especially critical in young learners
since proprioceptive information is less accurate in 6–8 chil-
dren, as compared to 10–12 children: estimation of their static
(initial) state is worse in the former than in the latter, which
results in increased movement trajectory variability (King et al.,
2012).
Although no clear explanation could be provided at that time,
an example of application of these principles can be found in
the famous method for keyboard playing by Bach (1753). Among
the recommendations made by this musician, several concern the
positioning of the arm, hand and ﬁngers. Adopting these correct
positions is critical for the future skills to be acquired as, according
to Bach (1753), incorrect positions will never allow the learner to
play correctly. The teachers should make the learner adopt com-
fortable or natural positions especially (1)with the forearm slightly
lower than the keyboard (which corresponds to a median position
for the wrist articulation), (2) with avoiding large movements of
the arm (which would involve several articulation which errors
of position are additive: Rossetti et al., 1994), which should move
as little as possible (3) with adopting positions for which the ﬁn-
gers are ﬂexed and not stretched; these ﬂexed positions (which,
as can be understood from Bach (1753) correspond to median
positions of the ﬁnger articulations) should allow the muscles not
to be stiff, stiffness being an obstacle to accurate, smooth and
adequate playing (remember that medial positions have also the
virtue to minimize medial muscle tension: Rossetti et al., 1994).
Moreover, still according to Bach (1753), a negative side effect of
ﬁngers stretching is that the position of the thumb remains too
far from the other ﬁngers (in other words, the articulation of the
thumb is in an extreme position, which is inappropriate for accu-
rate position information). One can imagine that more systematic
attention should be paid to these aspects for other motor skills
acquisition such as sport skills.
Moreover, in man–machine interfaces, several sensorimotor
tasks have to be performed by operators (for example, push as
soon as possible a remote button in response to visual or audi-
tory information – which is a prototypic pointing task). No care is
usually taken regarding the relative position of the buttons as com-
pared to the usual resting position of the hand. No much attention
is paid on the possible (or recommended) resting/average posi-
tions for the arms and hands. Therefore, the operators cannot
choose the most appropriate positions which are imposed by the
task and the interface.
Sequential movements, motor programming and chunking
Motor programs are learnt and, for sequential movements (such
as playingmusic), once they are initially learnt, evenmore learning
can improve them.
This is (at least in part) assumed to be achieved through clus-
tering together sets of elements of the sequence (e.g., Sakai et al.,
2003). This clustering operation is also called “chunking.” Since
activating motor programs takes time, chunking presents the
advantage to pool together the elementary programs correspond-
ing to each response of a sequence into a single program unit. Such
an advantage is illustrated in the following example: in a simple RT
task, although triggering a simple four-element ﬁnger movement
sequence takes 62 ms longer than triggering a one-element simple
ﬁnger response on a ﬁrst day, this effect vanishes after 8 days train-
ing (Klapp, 1995). This effect of learning is explained in terms of
chunking. When no choice is to be performed (simple RT task),
subjects can choose and program the ﬁrst element of a motor
sequence before the onset of the response signal (RS; Klapp, 1974;
Rosenbaum, 1980)3; as a consequence, the time necessary to pro-
gram this ﬁrst element does not contribute to RT. However, the
other elements of the sequence must be programmed during the
RT (and the time needed for this operation will increase the RT:
Sternberg et al., 1978) and/or during the execution of the sequence,
3We will justify this assumption in the “intrinsic factors” section.
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which may slower it. Therefore, chunking is a very efﬁcient way to
“compress” motor programs in order to save time when they are
to be activated quickly. This cannot be done without training.
This interpretation has received support from physiological
studies since, for example, the basal ganglia play a special role
in chunking. Indeed, it has been shown that although it is
possible to learn new sequences with basal ganglia impairment,
chunking is no longer possible (Boyd et al., 2009; Tremblay et al.,
2010).
Once again, it looks like keyboard players understood these
principles, long before neuroscientists, since different learning
methods seem to take chunking effects into account. Playing
a keyboard is typically a sequential activity and, for example,
Hanon (1873), in his famous “Le pianiste virtuose . . . (The virtu-
oso pianist . . .)” compilation of 60 exercises, recommends, when
beginning to learn, to play one’s scale by stressing one (or two)
note(s) every, say, 5–6 notes. This, of course produces a rhythm
which is not actually in the score but, he says, this will facilitate
learning. This facilitation can be interpreted in terms of chunk-
ing facilitation. Indeed, it is clear that these rhythms comprising
5–6 notes create artiﬁcial structures in the scale and allow group-
ing elements into chunks, which, as we mentioned earlier, is very
efﬁcient in term of fast sequence programming. We can see here
that Hanon (1873) recommends (counter-intuitively) not to begin
learning his exercises as they should be played; on the contrary, he
takes into account ﬁrst, what is better for learning and, only in a
second step, what is desirable for playing.
Moreover, as indicated earlier, the activationof motorprograms
takes time. This is certainly why, Hanon or Bach recommend play-
ing their exercises much slower than required on the score and, as
learning goes by, to accelerate accordingly. This is a very efﬁcient
way to take into account that, with training (because of chunk-
ing), the number of to-be-programmed elements will decrease;
as a consequence, the time needed to program (more exactly to
activate the motor programs of) these elements will also decrease
and will no longer be an obstacle to fast playing. Bach (1753)
writes that by accelerating progressively, the ﬁnger placement will
become so ﬂuid that there is “no need to think of it.” In our terms
one could translate (less artistically) the preceding words by: the
ﬁnger movements of the different sequences of the piece are “fully
programmed.”
RESPONSE SELECTION
Even when stimuli can be identiﬁed effortlessly and when
responses are very easy to execute, certain sensorimotor tasks may
be very difﬁcult to perform because certain stimulus-response
associations (or, in other words, response selections), are very
difﬁcult to implement.
Response selection refers to determining which response alter-
native is required by the RS, and must be distinguished from
response programming (more exactly motor program activation),
which, as we just discussed in the preceding section, refers to
organizing the selected movement. This determination process is,
therefore, neither directly dependent on the stimuli, nor directly
dependent on the responses and unit recordings in monkeys
indeed evidenced neurons reacting neither to a response nor to
a stimulus but selectively reacting to speciﬁc stimulus-response
associations (Zhang et al., 1997). This process must rely on a
stimulus-to-responses (S-R) mapping. This mapping will deﬁne
the nature of the task and, of course, it is most often established
by instruction. This last point is noteworthy since it is relevant
to the issue of learning: a learner who is taught a task by his/her
teacher will (in principle) comply with the instruction he/she is
given.
Rule-based vs. list-based S-R mapping
There are (at least) two ways to establish a mapping relationship
between a stimulus set and a response set: (1) a rule-based S-R
mapping and (2) a list-based S-R mapping.
In case (1), a rule establishes the nature of the S-R mapping;
for example instruction requires producing a right response to the
presentation of even digits and a left response to odd digits. In
case (2), instruction consists in an arbitrary list of digits-to-ﬁnger
mapping; for example 0, 3, 4, 6, or 7 require a right response
and 1,2,5,8, or 9 a left response. In case (1), the difﬁculty of the
response selection process will depend on how easily this rule
will be applied. In case (2) the difﬁculty of the response selection
process will depend on the length of the list (Hasbroucq et al.,
1990; Hasbroucq, unpublished). All other things being equal, it is
easier to apply and learn a rule-based mapping than a list-based
one (Hasbroucq et al., 1990; Hasbroucq, unpublished).
Response uncertainty has a very strong impact on performance.
This can be experimentally manipulated by varying the number
of response choices; it is well established that the RT and the
error rate increase with the number of possible responses (Hick,
1952). Of course, the number of choices can affect each level
of information processing: the perceptual level if, for example,
uncertainty involves the different positions of the possible RSs, as
well as the response level since only one among several possible
response programs must be activated.
Regarding the response selection level, the effect of the num-
ber of alternatives depends on the nature of the S-R mapping:
rule-based or list-based. It is clear that when list-based, the dif-
ﬁculty of the selection process will mainly depend on the size of
the list from which the subject must retrieve, at each trial, the
response corresponding to the presented stimulus. On the con-
trary, the process of applying a rule, being only dependent on
the nature of the rule, rule application is not supposed to depend
on the number of choices (Hasbroucq et al., 1990) and empirical
evidence support this view (Hasbroucq, unpublished). Therefore,
teachers, task prescribers or man–machine interfaces designers
should be aware of these principles and try to apply themwhenever
possible.
Stimulus-response compatibility effects
Stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effects can be deﬁned as
“. . . the modiﬁcation of performance induced by a change in the
SR [mapping] relationship that is uncorrelated with any change in
stimulation or responding”(Hasbroucq and Guiard, 1991, p. 246).
This deﬁnition is not theoretic but empiric and does not refer to
any speciﬁc mechanism. However, since this type of effects cannot
be accounted for by purely stimulus-related or purely response-
related phenomena, it must be assumed that it affects response
selection processes (e.g., Sanders, 1990). From this deﬁnition,
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it also appears that SRC effects only have to do with rule-based
mapping. Let us consider a very simple case of between-hand
choice RT task. Suppose that the stimuli consist in a visual dot
presented on the right or on the left side of the subject. If subjects
are instructed to respond on the same side as the stimulus (right
and left responses to right and left stimuli respectively), the RT is
shorter (Shaffer, 1966) than if subjects are instructed to respond
on the side opposite to the stimulus (right and left responses to
left and right stimuli, respectively). This simple case of spatial SRC
effect indicates that, all other things being equal, certain associ-
ations between stimuli and responses are easier to apply. These
concern instruction-based relationships.
Stimulus-response congruency effects
Now, it seems that irrelevant S-R transformations can also pro-
ceed automatically and inﬂuence RT, because overlearned. An
example of these automatic, irrelevant, overlearned S-R trans-
formations may be found in the Simon task (Simon, 1990; Lu
and Proctor, 1995, for reviews). In a Simon task, subjects have
to respond spatially (e.g., right or left; up or down . . .) to a non
spatial feature of a RS (e.g., color, pitch . . .), while ignoring its
spatial irrelevant feature. For example, subjects have to give a right
response to a blue stimulus or a left response to a yellow one,
regardless of the stimulus position (right or left). When the posi-
tion of the required response and that of the stimulus correspond
(congruent condition) the RT and the error rate are smaller than
when response and stimulus positions are opposite (incongruent
condition).
Although it is not warranted that the Simon effect involves
response selection processes only (Hasbroucq and Guiard, 1991),
response selection may be inﬂuenced by congruity (Carbonnell
et al., 2013).
It seems that, in a Simon task, two S-R transformations are acti-
vated in parallel: a controlled instruction-based transformation
plus an automatic one (always congruent, established by previous
experience or, in other word, learning)4.
On congruent conditions, both the automatic and controlled
S-R transformations activate the same (correct) response. On
the contrary, on incongruent conditions, while the controlled S-
R transformation activates the correct response, the automatic
transformation activates the incorrect one. As a consequence,
on incongruent conditions, these two S-R transformations will
compete and the resolution of this competition (Kornblum
et al., 1990) will take time (which increases the RT) and may
sometimes fail (which results in increased error rate). In more
complex situations, a priori naive judgements are not sufﬁcient
to determine which associations will be congruent and which
ones will not (Payne, 1995; Vu and Proctor, 2003; Hoffmann,
2010).
Now, what learning has done (establishing automatic associa-
tions), learning can also undo it. If subjects are trained to perform
a spatially incompatible RT task (i.e., respond right or left to left
4Remembering the distinction between “involuntary” and “effortless” meanings of
the term “automatic” (Regan, 1981), the important point here is that the congruent
response is triggered involuntarily since “once learned, an automatic process is
difﬁcult to suppress, to modify, or to ignore” (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2).
or right stimuli, respectively), and have to perform a Simon task
after, the Simon effect vanishes (Tagliabue et al., 2000, 2002).
Before practice, tasks are often explained to learners by instruc-
tion; instruction being usually the ﬁrst event when teaching a
task. Instructions alone can establish or abolish stimulus-response
association without practice. If subjects must pronounce the
meaningless syllables “bee” or “boo” in response to the presen-
tation of words meaning either right or left and, in other trials,
must give a “bee” or a “boo” response to blue or green squares,
respectively, RT is faster when the blue square is presented to the
right than when it is presented to the left: an instruction-based
Simon effects appears (De Houwer et al., 2005). Conversely, if
a preparatory instruction indicates which mapping (compatible
or incompatible) should be applied for a spatial task following a
Simon task, in the same trial, the regular Simon effect vanishes
on the (ﬁrst) Simon task, if the instructed mapping of the spatial
task is incompatible (but persists if the spatial task mapping is
compatible; Theeuwes et al., 2014).
To sum up: (1) certain S-R mapping rules, equally easy to
understand (e.g., respond on the same side as the stimulus, or
respond on the side opposite to the stimulus), are not equally easy
to implement; (2) given a S-R mapping rule (e.g., respond left
to blue stimuli or right to yellow ones), certain S-R associations
may facilitate (congruent associations) or impair (incongruent
associations) response selection processes and, as a consequence,
performance; (3) the congruent, incongruent (or neutral) nature
of a new S-R association cannot be determined naively but must
be established empirically, (4) the way learners are instructed
to perform a task has a critical inﬂuence on response selection
processes (e.g., Tandonnet et al., 2014) since, (a) instructions
establish S-R associations, (b) instructions alone can induce con-
gruency effects, (c) instructions alone can abolish congruency
effects.
INTRINSIC FACTORS
Dependent on the structure of tasks, advance information regard-
ing the to-be-performed responses is available or not. This prior
informationmay allow subjects to orient appropriately their atten-
tion, to select in advance the appropriate response, to program
completely or partially their response. Of course, this depends on
the structure of the task and, as such, availability of advance infor-
mation belongs to extrinsic factors. Now, subjects can decide to
use or not to use advance information and, as such, the effects of
advance information also depend on intrinsic factors. Because, the
effects of advance information as well as “purely” intrinsic factors
can be uniﬁed in terms of executive control, we chose to discuss
them in this section.
PREPARATION
Advance information is supposed to reduce subjects’ uncertainty
regarding forthcoming events. This information can be relative to
events proper (for example, the nature of a RS). This information
can also be relative to timing (for example the moment of occur-
rence of a RS). Therefore, when prior information is available,
it is possible to get prepared, either to which event(s) will occur
or to when event(s) will occur, or both. This preparation can be
evidenced by the fact that RT is much faster when preparation
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is possible than when it is not. Depending on the nature of
advance information (regarding “what” or regarding “when”),
Requin et al. (1991) distinguished two, not mutually exclusive,
types of preparation: event preparation and time preparation.
Event preparation
If a soccer goal-keeper facing a penalty shoot moves toward one
side before the shooter kicks the ball, this information will be
used by the shooter to score on the other side. Now, if the goal-
keeper waits for the kick and, then, tries to react appropriately,
he/she will never stop the ball because his/her RT will be too
long. Therefore, goal-keepers make a bet, “choosing” one side
in advance and, if the shooter happens to shoot at this same
side, they get a chance to stop the ball. What do journalists actu-
ally mean when saying that a goal-keeper who stopped a penalty
shoot has “chosen” the right side? They mean that (according to
which his coach taught him), he/she selected one side and pre-
pared a jump toward this side. As a consequence, his/her RT
has been short enough to allow him/her having his/her hand at
the right place on time, and stop the ball5. This example illus-
trates the beneﬁts of event preparation in the domain of response
preparation.
Responses. But what do we mean when we say that the goal-keeper
has “prepared” a jump in a predetermined direction? An impor-
tant observation is that event preparation reduces RT. Therefore,
either processing speed regarding some operations increases when
preparing or, at constant processing speed, certain operations are
done in advance and are not required anymore after the RS, which
reduces RT.
First, the goal keeper can, at least, decide in advance toward
which side he/she will react. In other words, the selection pro-
cess can be achieved before the ball is kicked and this contributes
reducing RT. But what about motor programs?
When a response is programmed, it has necessarily been
selected. Therefore, selection and programming operations may
often be confounded factors. To disentangle selection and motor
programming, a solution proposed by Klapp et al. (1974) is to
evaluate motor programming while maintaining constant the
number of choices. Klapp et al. (1974) wondered whether the
duration of a motor response could be a speciﬁed parameter
of motor programs. In a RT paradigm, subjects had to pro-
duce either a short (150 ms) or a long (600 ms) keypress. In
choice RT conditions (where no program can be prepared), RT
was shorter before a short than a long keypress. On the con-
trary, if a cue indicated before the RS which response (short or
long) should be produced, no RT difference was found between
short and long responses. The authors therefore concluded that
the short–long differences in choice RT revealed differences in
the times needed to program a short and a long response. The
absence of such an effect when the same responses were pre-
cued indicated that, in this case, programming operations had
taken place before the RS, and, consequently, did not inﬂuence
RT anymore. This interaction between response duration and
conditions (uncuded vs precued response duration) was a strong
5In this case, it is likely that the side of the jump is chosen in advance while the hand
(or foot) stopping movement is determined after.
argument in favor of the idea that, with prior information, motor
programming can occur in advance. In other words, what has
been done during the preparatory period (PP; programming)
has no longer to be done after the RS (which contributes reduc-
ing RT). Note that, in Klapp et al.’s (1974) paradigm, there was
no confounding factor (e.g., selection) with response program-
ming. The short-long effect has been reproduced several times
by different teams (e.g., Zelaznik and Hahn, 1985; Vidal et al.,
1995).
Klapp et al. (1974) inferred from the RT pattern they observed
that response duration was prepared before the RS when pre-
cued. Vidal et al. (1995) provided physiological support in favor
of this view. They recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) activ-
ity over motor areas in humans during the PP of a precueing
(Rosenbaum, 1980) paradigm where subjects had to produce
either a short (700 ms) or a long (2500 ms) interval delimited
by two brief button presses. Two seconds before the RS, a precue
could either indicatewhich response (short or long) should be pro-
duced, or give no information regarding response duration. The
short–long effect was reproduced. Moreover, during the PP, EEG
activity was small when the cue gave no advance information, and
larger when the cue indicated which response to produce. How-
ever, this simple effect could be attributed to motor programming,
response selection or both. The important ﬁnding was that, when
the cue indicated which response to produce, EEG activity was
larger for the short than for the long response during the PP. In
other words, when duration programming was assumed to occur
during the PP, a short–long effect was observed on the amplitude
of preparatory EEG activity. It is to be noted that this effect was
observable over the supplementary motor areas (but not over the
primary motor areas) in the early part of the PP, while the same
effect showed up in the very late part of the PP over the primary
motor areas (but not over the supplementary motor areas any-
more). This latter point suggested that duration programming
had taken place (at least in part) in the supplementary motor
areas with advance information and that the program had been
later transferred to the primary motor areas, just before the “go”
signal, for execution.
Unit activities recordings from monkeys also support the view
that response parameters can be programmed in advance. For
example, Riehle (1991) could record primary motor cortex neu-
rons which activity was phasically related to the precue when this
signal indicated in advance which response was to be executed and
these neurons did not react after the RS. On the contrary, when
the precue gave no advance information regarding the response,
these neurons were almost inactive after the precue but phasically
discharged after the RS (which, in this case, gave all information
regarding the response to be produced). Once again, the activ-
ity of these neurons suggests that what had been done before
(shortly after the precue), has no longer to be done after the RS;
with uninformative precues, this still needed to be done just after
the RS.
Coming back to the goal keeper, it seems quite safe to conclude
that, when  choosing  a side, he/she selects this side ﬁrst
and programs all the initial sequence of his/her jump. These two
processes do not contribute to his RT anymore; as a consequence,
his RT is shorter, which increases his/her chances to stop the ball.
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Stimuli. Preparatory information regarding events may also
improve operations upstream programming and selection
processes, that is, stimulus processing. This has been clearly and
elegantly demonstrated by Posner et al. (1980). In a RT task,
subjects had to respond as soon as possible by a keypress after
a RS which could be presented to the right or to the left of a
ﬁxation point. Before the RS, an arrow pointing to the right
or the left indicated on which side the RS was more likely to
occur: in 80% of the trials, the RS occurred on the side indi-
cated by the arrow (valid trials) and in 20% of the trials, the
RS occurred on the other side (invalid trials). Although sub-
jects had to keep their gaze oriented on the ﬁxation point, RT
was shorter in valid than in invalid conditions. The important
point to be noticed, here, is that the response to be produced
was always the same. Therefore, the decrease in RT could not
be attributed to advance selection or programming processes.
Posner et al. (1980), interpreted their results in term of attentional
effects: covert attention was oriented on the side indicated by
the arrows. This allowed faster detection of the stimuli in the
valid condition, at the cost of slower detection (as compared
to a neutral condition) in the invalid condition. These effects
have been reproduced several times ever since (e.g., Coull and
Nobre, 1998). They demonstrate how voluntary orientation of
attention improves stimulus processing, provided that attention is
appropriately oriented.
Time preparation
AtAtlanta’s 1996OlympicGames, British sprinter LinfordChristie
false-started twice in the men’s 100 m ﬁnal and was disqual-
iﬁed from the competition. He refused the decision, remained
on the track and delayed the ﬁnal for several minutes. At Paris’s
2003world championship,American sprinter JonDrummondalso
false-started in a 100 m quarterﬁnal. Drummond also contested
the decision and stayed on the track repeatedly shouting“I did not
move.”
What happened to these champions illustrates an interesting
aspect of time preparation. Before a 100 m race, there is no uncer-
tainty regarding the“what,”which can be fully prepared. Preparing
the “when” would also reduce RT but, since the delay between the
“get set”order and the“go”signal is a priori unpredictable, it seems
that time preparation is impossible in this situation. However,
since this delay cannot last very long, as time goes by after the “get
set”order, the probability that the“go”signalwill occur“right now”
increases progressively and the level of preparation may increase
accordingly. One can therefore imagine that these two sprinters,
under strong motivation, prepared as well as possible the motor
sequence corresponding to their start but also got prepared for the
moment when the “go” signal would occur, so much prepared that
refraining moving began impossible too early; they probably did
not feel that they had anticipated the go signal (which, it seems,
they actually did).
The case of the abovementioned sprinters is particular because
they prepared their move and (to a certain extent) the moment to
move. Although counter intuitive, it is also possible to prepare the
moment without being able to prepare the response. For example,
in choice RT tasks in which the moment of occurrence of the RS is
predictable, RT is faster than when the occurrence of the RS is not
(or less) predictable (Requin et al., 1991, for a review). However,
the locus of the effect of time preparation is still a matter of debate.
In the following, we will provide arguments indicating that time
preparation affects (at least) sensory and motor processes6.
Responses. Absolute accuracy of time estimation decreases as the
duration to be estimated increases (Gibbon, 1977). As a conse-
quence, preparation is better timed for short foreperiods than for
longer ones. This would explain why RT increases with increas-
ing foreperiod duration7, provided that each foreperiod duration
is administered in different blocks of trials (Woodrow, 1914).
Therefore, a convenient way to manipulate time preparation is
to manipulate the duration of PPs across blocks of trials.
It has been shown that time preparation modiﬁes the excitabil-
ity of corticospinal pathways during the PP (e.g., Davranche
et al., 2007). However, these preparatory effects do not demon-
strate that motor processes are speeded up. Therefore, Tandonnet
et al. (2003, 2012) examined the time course of activation of the
primary motor cortex during the RT period following short or
long foreperiods, with EEG and transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS). In a between-hand choice RT task, Tandonnet et al.
(2003), used Laplacian-transformed data which allowed them to
examine EEG activities of the primary motor cortex contralat-
eral to the responding hand (M1). The authors showed that the
time separating M1 activation from EMG onset was shorter after
a short (500 ms) than a long (2500 ms) foreperiod. This indicated
that better time preparation (during short foreperiods) speed up
motor processes. In other words the authors showed that there
is (at least) a motor locus for the effects of time preparation.
In the same vein, Tandonnet et al. (2012), using TMS, examined
the time course of excitability of the primary motor cortex con-
tralateral to the responding hand in a between-hand choice RT
task following the same foreperiods. The authors showed that,
after the RS, the amplitude of the motor evoked potential of the
responding hand increased earlier following the short than the
long foreperiod. Note that such an effect was absent for the non-
responding hand. Moreover, the dissociation between responding
and non responding hands occurred earlier after the short than
after the long foreperiod. This again indicated that the required
response is implemented faster in the corticospinal system when
time preparation is more efﬁcient. As a consequence, it seems
that time preparation speeds up motor processes (even when
event preparation is impossible), which contributes improving
performance.
Stimuli. Time preparation can also improve stimulus processing.
Coull and Nobre (1998) examined the effect of time preparation
on stimulus processing using a temporal variant of the Posner
et al.’s (1980) task. In a simple RT task, subjects had to respond as
soon as possible by a keypress after a RS which could be presented
to the right or to the left of a ﬁxation point. Before the RS, a
preparatory signal could prime the duration (short: 300 ms or
6Although effects of time preparation on central processes cannot be excluded, this
idea is, to our opinion, less grounded yet; therefore we will not present or discuss it
here.
7This effect holds for foreperiods superior to 200 ms otherwise, there is no time
enough to get prepared (Bertelson, 1967).
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long: 1500 ms) of the foreperiod (i.e., the moment when a RS
would be presented). This prime was valid in 80% and invalid in
20% of the trials. RTs were faster for validly than invalidly primed
foreperiods. However, this effect was much larger for invalid long
primes and modest (or even absent) for invalid short primes. The
authors convincingly argued that when subjects have anticipated
a long foreperiod, the RS occurs too early and ﬁnds subjects in
an unprepared state, which impairs their performance. On the
contrary, when subjects have anticipated a short period and the
stimulus has not occurred after a time corresponding to the end of
the short foreperiod, subjects necessarily know that the stimulus
will occur later, at the end of the long foreperiod. In this case, they
can reorient their attention during the waiting delay, which allows
them maintaining their performance.
Note that, in this experiment again, only one response was pos-
sible; therefore RT variations could not be attributed to selection
and/or programming operations. Subject only had to detect the
signal and, then, execute the pre-selected and pre-programmed
response. Now, keeping in mind that time preparation can speed
up motor processes (Tandonnet et al., 2003, 2012), it could well be
that the RT advantage provided by time preparation was in part
or completely due to motor improvement (speeding up). How-
ever, Davranche et al. (2011), in a detection task without any time
pressure, demonstrated that time preparation actually facilitates
stimulus detection for precued short foreperiods.
Coming back, now, to false start 100 m races, it is clear that,
although accurate event preparation is encouraged, it seems that
time preparation is prohibited. Indeed, Linford Christie was dis-
qualiﬁed not because he moved before the go signal but because he
reacted too fast (60 ms). RTs inferior to 100 ms are considered as
false starts because it is assumed that reacting in less than 100 ms is
not physiologically possible. Let us indicate here that we feel that
this opinion is not ﬁrmly physiologically grounded and appears
somehow arbitrary. If one really wants to discourage time antic-
ipation, there are psycho-physiologically efﬁcient ways to avoid
it. Instead of having the go signal given by a human operator, it
could easily be given by an automatic mechanism using so called
“non aging” probability functions to determine the occurrence of
go signals. Such a procedure would render almost impossible time
preparation and, therefore, would probably avoid these recurrent
false start problems.
To sum up, as soon as any type of information is available,
whether it concerns the nature of the incoming events or the
moment when something will occur, the human brain adapts in
advance. By doing so, it anticipates future events thereby avoid-
ing that adaptation takes place under time pressure, in reaction to
these events. In otherwords, preparation processes can help release
time pressure since all computations done in advance don’t need
to be repeated during the time left to react. Therefore, when rel-
evant events occur, the “reactive” processing cost is lower thereby
increasing processing efﬁcacy. Several examples of anticipatory
adaptation to predictable events can be found in other domains of
physiology such as blood pressure regulation, thermoregulation
or regulation of glycemia.
Event and time preparation are of prominent importance for
several activities that must be learnt such as, for example,driving,
sport, hunting, or music.
In driving, a large part of teaching consists in making learn
what must be anticipated. On the event side of preparation one
can cite (non exhaustively): learning to get prepared to the nature
of the road given the corresponding road signs, get prepared to
the reactions of the car to the drivers’ actions, get prepared to
the possible moves of the other drivers . . . On the time side of
preparation one can cite (non exhaustively): learning to get pre-
pared to the time it takes to stop after breaking, get prepared to the
moment when the trafﬁc light will turn red/green, get prepared
to the deceleration in a very close future of the preceding vehicle
when the braking lights turn on . . ..
In a similar way a hunter, before becoming a good hunter, must
learn to read (interpret) the signs available in nature which allow
him/her to anticipate and get prepared to what the game might do
and when it might to it.
In team sports, a large part of learning also consists in becoming
able to “read” the game. Reading the game amounts to being able
to anticipate the moves of the other players, get prepared and
act quickly in consequence. This preparation relates, not only on
what the other players will do (or will not do) but also relates on
when they might do it. In certain sports, such as rugby football,
certain game sequences are completely repeated and learnt before
thematches. This trainingwill notmake the players, say, run faster.
However, it will allow accurate execution of motor programs (see
preceding section) and, overall, full preparation of each player to
the different events of the sequence. This full preparation gives
them a signiﬁcant advantage as compared to the adverse players
who cannot do better than react to this sequence – except if the
adverse coach has studied videos of previous matches and trained
his own team to anticipate for such sequences (if they are used too
often). Anticipation is also critical in other sports such as combat
sports or any sport in which, reading and anticipating opponent’s
actions provides an serious advantage (e.g., tennis).
Finally, in music, temporal preparation is critical: anticipation
of rhythmic patterns is essential for musical expectancy and, of
course, for accurate performance. Moreover playing instruments
presenting a certain“inertia” (for example there is a non negligible
delay between the moments when a musician blows in a tuba
and the moment when the corresponding sound is produced)
needs that the musician learns (and is prepared to) this inertia
before being able to play in an orchestra. Event preparation is also
important and must be learnt in music. When playing together,
musicians performing music with a sketchy outline voluntarily
exchange non-verbal cues; these cues act as preparatory signals
and can be non temporal (speciﬁc movements, face expressions,
glances . . .) or temporal information. For example, jazzmen, in
their communication, learn to exchange temporal cues which take
the form of subtle deviations from the well-established rhythmic
pattern (Vuust et al., 2005).
STRATEGIC EFFECTS: SPEED–ACCURACY TRADE-OFFS
Among strategic effects SATs are well documented. As we will
see below, it is possible to trade speed against accuracy and
accuracy against speed. Long term (between experimental con-
ditions) strategic changes are called macro trade-offs, while short
term (from trial to trial) changes are called micro trade-offs (e.g.,
Jentzsch and Leuthold, 2006).
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Macro trade-offs
As indicated in the ﬁrst section, increasing time pressure by con-
straining the time let for giving the appropriate response after
a RS, results in an increase in error rate. This is an extrinsic
constraint. Now, subjects can also choose to increase speed or
accuracy spontaneously or, for example, to comply with experi-
menter or teacher instructions. If they increase speed, this will be
at the cost of increasing the error rate. Conversely if they choose
to increase accuracy, this will be done at the cost of increasing
RT. In other words, subjects can trade accuracy against speed and
conversely. This trade-off takes the form of an S-shaped curve.
This phenomenon has been called SAT (Fitts, 1966; Pew, 1969).
This phenomenon can be used for training and, according to the
performance pattern displayed by learners, teachers can encour-
age their trainees to favor speed or accuracy at different stages of
learning and performance. Indeed, subjects comply quite easily
with speed/accuracy instructions.
Micro trade-offs
In choice RT time tasks, as mentioned above, errors may occur.
RT of errors is often (but not always) faster than that of correct
responses (Smith and Brewer, 1995). After errors, the RT is longer
(post-error slowing) than after correct responses (Rabbitt, 1966;
Smith and Brewer, 1995; Allain et al., 2009) and the error rate may
also be lower (Laming, 1979; Ruitenberg et al., 2014). On the con-
trary, before errors, RT is shorter (pre-error speeding) than before
a correct response (Smith and Brewer, 1995; Allain et al., 2009;
Dutilh et al., 2012a). This saw tooth pattern of RT suggests that
these sequential adjustments are strategic and reﬂect trial-by-trial
micro trade-offs (Smith and Brewer, 1995). After an error, sub-
jects would adopt a more cautious strategy (Laming, 1979; Dutilh
et al., 2012b; Ruitenberg et al., 2014; but see Notebaert et al., 2009
for alternative accounts) and on the subsequent trials, subjects
becoming more and more conﬁdent would progressively speed
up until an error is generated again. These micro trade-offs sug-
gest that an action monitoring system is at work at each trial and,
as a function of performance, regulates responding behavior in
order to optimize it (Botvinick et al., 2001). Therefore, these micro
trade-offs would reveal trial by trial, “off line,” action monitoring.
The implication of post-error slowing in learning is not obvi-
ous; however, it is possible that this type of adjustment reﬂects a
fast short-termed learning process from the preceding error.
ON LINE ACTION MONITORING
In the preceding section, micro trade-offs suggest that an action
monitoring system triggers behavioral adjustments to optimize
performance. These adjustments occurring in reaction to errors,
we can qualify them as “reactive.”Of course, these reactive adjust-
ments occur between trials. One could wonder whether such
reactions to errors might also occur within trial.
Reactive action monitoring
EMG indices. In a between-hand choice RT task, Allain et al.
(2004) recorded surface electromyographic (EMG) activity of the
prime mover muscles involved in the two possible responses. They
showed that the amplitude of the erroneous EMG bursts was
smaller than that of the correct ones The initial slope of these
EMG bursts being identical on correct responses and on errors,
it is likely that the initial motor command was identical in both
types of responses. Therefore, it seems that the smaller EMGbursts
observed on errors reﬂect an inhibition of the motor command
during its execution. If this interpretation is valid we can con-
clude that once the error is triggered, the actionmonitoring system
detects it and reacts in an attempt to stop it. Now, considering that
these errors were committed, it seems that the action monitoring
system failed. What could, therefore, be the functional signiﬁcance
of this EMG effect?
Coles et al. (1985) showed that, in between-hand choice
RTs tasks, certain correct responses are preceded by a small
sub-threshold EMG activation (insufﬁcient to trigger an overt
response) on the “wrong” side. The RT of these correct trials
is longer than that of correct trials which do not contain sub-
threshold incorrect EMG activations (termed“pure” correct trials,
in the following). These observationshavebeen reproduced several
times ever since (e.g., Allain et al., 2009).
There is a general agreement that, since these sub-threshold
activations occurred on the “wrong” side, they correspond to
partial errors. Burle et al. (2002b) proposed, in addition, that
these partial errors correspond to almost errors that have been
detected, inhibited and corrected on time. Allain et al. (2009) pro-
vided arguments in favor of this view, showing that sequential
speeding and slowing adjustments also exist before and after par-
tial errors respectively, although the size of these adjustments is
smaller for partial than for full blown errors. Moreover, the fact
that RT is longer on partial error trials than on pure correct tri-
als could be a sign that, after a partial error, a part of processing
operations must be done again in order to produce the correct
response.
If these interpretations are correct, the existenceof partial errors
indicates that the action monitoring system is most often able to
detect, inhibit and correct erroneous motor commands. When
it works, this results in a partial error; when it fails this results
in a full blown error; however, on errors, a sign of the tentative
inhibition implemented by the action monitoring system can be
found in the smaller size of the EMG bursts as compared to pure
correct responses. Finally, still if these interpretations are correct,
it is possible to calculate an index of the efﬁciency of the action
monitoring system: the correction ratio, which corresponds to the
ratio between successfully corrected incorrect activations (partial
errors) and the total amount of incorrect activations (partial errors
plus full errors; Burle et al., 2002b). For example, in the Simon task,
the error rate is higher on incongruent than on congruent trials, as
indicated above. However, a part of this effect is due to a decrease
of the correction ratio on incongruent trials. Therefore, a part
of the increase of the error rate on incongruent trials is due to a
lowered efﬁciency of the action monitoring system. This indicates
that there are two (not mutually exclusive) ways to deteriorate
performance in terms of accuracy: decreasing the efﬁciency of the
information processing chain, or decreasing the efﬁciency of the
action monitoring system (or both, as it is the case on incongruent
trials of a Simon task).
EEG indices. Falkenstein et al. (1991) discovered that a large
response-locked event-related potential (ERP) was evoked by
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errors. Since this ERP seemed speciﬁc to errors, it has been
called error negativity (Ne) or, later on, error-related negativ-
ity (ERN: Gehring et al., 1993)8. Scheffers et al. (1996) showed
that an Ne was also evoked by partial errors, although its ampli-
tude was smaller than on errors. This observation makes sense
if one admits that partial errors are almost errors. Finally, using
Laplacian-transformed data, Vidal et al. (2000) unmasked a small
Ne-like on correct trials, too, that had been unnoticed so far. It
is clear that the discovery of the Ne constituted strong evidence
for the existence of an action monitoring system able to quickly9
separate errors from correct responses at the very moment of the
response. However, revealing the existence of anNe-like on correct
responses, also raised the question of the relationship between the
Ne and the Ne-like waves: if the Ne-like is just a small Ne, then
current models of action monitoring need to be revised to incor-
porate this ﬁnding that they cannot account for; if the Ne-like
corresponds to another component, the Ne is speciﬁc to errors
(full blown or partial) and there is no need for such a revision.
Recent data (Bonini et al., 2014) suggest that the Ne and the Ne-
like share (at least) a common source: the supplementary motor
areas proper (SMAp). This ﬁnding suggests that the Ne-like and
the Ne correspond to a same component which is modulated in
amplitude: small on correct responses, larger on partial errors and
even larger on full blown errors. Although this sensitivity of SMAp
to performance is a sign of the existence of an action monitoring
system, as initially shownby Falkenstein et al. (1991), its functional
signiﬁcance is not obvious. It has been proposed that SMAp could
generate warning“default” signals which amplitude would depend
on the ongoing performance (Bonini et al., 2014).
The sensitivity of SMAp to performance, just after EMG onsets,
corresponds to another piece of evidence that the action monitor-
ing system reacts within trial to the quality of performance.
Proactive action monitoring
In the preceding sections, we have seen that EMG and EEG data
indicate that the action monitoring system reacts to incorrect acti-
vations in an attempt to correct them and avoid full blown errors.
One could, ﬁnally, wonder whether the action monitoring sys-
tem could act before incorrect activations occur in an attempt to
prevent them.
Hasbroucq et al. (2000), using H reﬂex showed that, in a
between-hand choice RT task, the excitability of spinal motoneu-
rons corresponding to the responding hand increased, while
it decreased on the other side, just before response execution.
Burle et al. (2002a), using TMS showed that, in a between-hand
choice RT task, the excitability of the primary motor cortex con-
tralateral to the responding hand (contra M1) increased before
response execution, while that of the primary motor cortex ipsi-
lateral to the responding hand (ipsi M1) decreased. Finally, using
Laplacian-transformed EEG recordings over contra and ipsi M1,
Vidal et al. (2003) reported, in a between-hand choice RT task, a
response-locked negative/positive pattern, likely corresponding to
anEEGcounterpart of the activation/inhibitionpatternpreviously
8TheNemust not be confoundedwith the feedback-relatednegativity (FRN:Miltner
et al., 1997) which may be elicited by error feed-backs.
9The Ne begins about 30 ms after EMG onset but before the mechanical response.
evidenced with other techniques by Hasbroucq et al. (2000) and
Burle et al. (2002a). While it had previously been shown in
monkeys that the negativity observed over contra M1 corresponds
to the activation of the apical dendrites of layer V of contra
M1 (Arezzo and Vaughan, 1980), the nature of ipsilateral inhi-
bition appeared less clearly. Considering that, before spontaneous
movements, contra M1 activation is present but not ispi M1 inhi-
bition (e.g., Ikeda et al., 1995), Vidal et al. (2003) proposed that
this inhibition was needed for preventing the emission of the
“wrong” response. In other words, ipsilateral inhibition could
represent the existence of an a priori mechanism of error pre-
vention set proactively by the action monitoring system. In a
go no-go task, errors are possible but, contrary to choice RT
ones, not with the non responding hand. Vidal et al. (2011)
showed that ipsilateral inhibition was absent in a go no-go task,
which was in line with the interpretation of ipsi M1 inhibition
by Vidal et al. (2003). Finally, in a between-hand choice RT task,
Meckler et al. (2010) manipulated the risk of committing errors.
They compared a “classical” choice RT with a biased one. In the
classical condition, each response was equiprobable (50%) while
in the biased one, one of the two responses was 80% proba-
ble (and the other one 20%, only). In the 80% condition, the
response was expected, in the 50% condition there was no spe-
ciﬁc expectation, while in the 20% condition the response was
unexpected. RT and error rates increased from expected to no
expectation conditions and from no expectation to unexpected
conditions.
Contra M1 activation was not affected by expectation. On the
contrary, ipsilateral inhibition was small in the expected condi-
tion, larger in the no expectation condition and even larger in
the unexpected condition. Meckler et al. (2010) concluded that
ipsilateral inhibition was actually set to prevent errors, especially
when considering that, in the unexpected condition, there was
an inverse (between-subjects) correlation between the strength of
ipsilateral inhibition and the error rate. In other words, in the con-
dition where the risk of committing an error was highest, those
subjects whose inhibition was stronger were those who committed
the smallest proportion of errors.
Therefore, it seems that ipsi M1 inhibition is a physiological
marker of a “double-checks” proactive action monitoring mecha-
nism. Whether or not this proactive mechanism develops during
the task by training is not known, yet. However, the possibility to
develop this inhibition needs a certain degree of maturation. Van
de Laar et al. (2012) showed that ipsi M1 inhibition was neither
present in 8-years old nor in 12-years old children. It is worth
noticing that the absence of inhibition in children was associ-
ated to almost 3 times (2.9) more partial errors and 3 times more
errors than in 20-years old young adults. Although Van de Laar
et al. (2012) did not address or discuss the following point, it is
easy from their Table 2 (which reports partial and full error rates)
to calculate correction ratios (Burle et al., 2002b). A striking result
appears: young children corrected their incorrect activations in
75% of the cases while young adults corrected them in 76% of the
cases. Although no statistical data are available inVan de Laar et al.
(2012), it is very likely that correction rates of children and adults
did not differ. As a consequence, it is not action monitoring as a
whole which is deﬁcient in children: their high error rate cannot be
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attributed to reactive action monitoring failure, as revealed by par-
tial errors. It seems, on the contrary, that their deﬁciency must be
found, at least in part, in immature proactive action monitoring,
as revealed by their lack of ipsilateral M1 inhibition.
To sum up, recent research showed that, even under time
pressure, sensorimotor information processing may not be com-
pletely unidirectional: reprocessing can quickly be triggered by
the action monitoring system in reaction to incorrectly activated
responses. These reactive mechanisms allow avoiding several overt
errors. Moreover, not only does the brain react to incorrect activa-
tions but it also anticipates them and sets preventive mechanisms
to avoid them in error-prone situations. It is noteworthy that
that the reactive side of the action monitoring system is efﬁ-
cient quite early in childhood, but that its proactive side needs
a longer maturation to optimize performance in sensorimotor
activities.
From what precedes it is quite clear that the human brain is not
structured to function errorless, this having been recognized long
ago by Seneca through his famous “errare humanum est.” What is
newer is the fact that errors are largely dealt with at different levels
of information processing: prevention, detection, inhibition, cor-
rection and, if these mechanisms ﬁnally failed, strategic behavioral
adjustments after errors.
The intrinsic proneness of humans to commit errors indicates
that, after failures due to human errors (in industry, transporta-
tion . . .), adding new prescriptions is probably of little use. A
more efﬁcient attitude could be to ask oneself whether or not some
situations, tasks or material, due to the nature or human informa-
tion processing system, would favour human errors. Moreover,
it could also be wondered whether some slight modiﬁcations of a
task would allow operators to correct their errors, since the human
brain is equipped of a rather efﬁcient action monitoring system
which might allow certain failures to be avoided.
Teachers, may be, should not be that severe as regard errors.
Errors sometimes reﬂect low involvement, negligence or low moti-
vation but, often, they simply reﬂect the nature of the human
information processing system. It seems that errors should, on
the contrary, be used for teaching efﬁcient correction and how to
avoid them in the future. Finally, an error by itself is often assumed
to be a very efﬁcient teacher because learning from past mistakes
is essential to ensure future successful behavior (e.g., Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). It has been proposed that the Ne reﬂects a key mech-
anism for this type of learning from errors (Holroyd and Coles,
2002).
Now, it could be hoped that, in speciﬁc situations, if precise
enough instructions or long enough teaching is provided, errors
could be completely eradicated. Although, from what precedes,
one can cast somedoubts regarding the results, wewonderwhether
one should hope complete eradication of errors. Indeed, it is pos-
sible that certain general principles of organization are efﬁcient
whatever the considered organization level. If this were the case,
one could wonder whether some principles of organization of the
sensorimotor systemcouldﬁnd correspondences in other domains
where reliability is also critical. We will try a comparison with the
apparently remote domain of DNA replication.
The high (but not perfect) reliability of DNA replication mech-
anisms is not only dependent of complementary base-pairing.
It also needs different “proofreading” enzymatic mechanisms
that sequentially correct mispairing, when present (Alberts et al.,
2002).
Complementary base-pairing is not extremely reliable and may
produce several initial mispairing. However, certain of these ini-
tial mispairing are rendered impossible by DNA polymerase itself
which “double-checks” the base-pair conﬁguration before this
enzyme catalyzes the covalent binding of mispaired nucleotides. In
a second step, if this double-checks mechanism has failed and an
incorrectly paired base has been covalently bound to the growing
strand, a separate subunit or a separate domain of DNA poly-
merase, acting as a “self-correcting” system (called “exonucleolytic
proofreading”), will correct several of these incorrect pairings.
Now, if this self-correcting mechanism also fails, another and
last proofreading mechanism (called “strand-directed mismatch
repair”) will detect most remaining anomalous pairings and cor-
rect them. The end product of DNA replication is, ﬁnally, highly
reliable and results in a very small proportion of errors (Alberts
et al., 2002).
In our terms one could say that the replication process ini-
tially engages a preventive (proactive) mechanism with DNA
polymerase double-checks. If this proactive mechanism fails, two
successive reactive proofreading ones will detect and correct most
remaining incorrect base-pairings. [which we could qualify as
partial (replication) errors, since covalent binding has already
occurred]. Full blown errors are those, when present, which
escaped prevention, detection, and correction by the enzymatic
replication monitoring system. This enzymatic monitoring sys-
tem is to be considered as a very sophisticated mechanism which
has evolved so efﬁciently that it powerfully secures the replication
process. One might also consider that this system is not com-
pletely perfect, yet (since some errors occasionally still occur) and
hope that, after a few million more years of evolution, full repli-
cation errors will be completely eradicated. However, this should
not be: it is clear that maintaining a certain level of errors con-
stitutes a supreme reﬁnement of evolution, without which any
adaptation of living beings to changing environments would be
impossible. Eradicating completely errors wouldmean the assured
future death of all living species.
If we accept to consider that sensorimotor activities seem to
obey similar rules as DNA duplication does, it could also well
be that errors should not be eradicated either in sensorimotor
activities. Errors might constitute a behavioral avatar of biological
variability. This variability might allow exploring new behaviors.
Of course, most of these new behaviors reveal to be inappropriate,
but some can occasionally reveal to be perfectly ﬁt to an unnoticed
change of the environment. In this latter case, these new behav-
iors, discovered by error, may become the new norm and could
even be taught to others. As a consequence, teachers should not
be completely negative as regards errors because (1) errors prob-
ably contribute to shape efﬁcient and long-living new behaviors,
which constitute a sort of self random learning, and (2) errors,
even when they do not reveal new appropriate behavior, trigger
behavioral adaptations (such as, for example post-error slowing)
aimed at avoiding the same kind of errors in the future. This
implies that errors, when produced in a given context where they
are not too costly, might help avoiding future errors in more costly
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contexts. As such, errors might be exploited in a teaching perspec-
tive. Therefore, teachers should, to a certain extent, recognize and
try to exploit the virtues of errors.
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